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Introduction: 
The expanded conception of security and institutions 
 
HITOSHI NASU and KIM RUBENSTEIN 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
Security is a dynamic, context-dependent concept that is inevitably 
shaped by social conditions and practices. The socio-political 
perception of security threats influences our security policies 
relevant to political decisions about the design of social institutions 
specifically addressing those security concerns. Security is 
traditionally understood to be physical protection of national 
territory and its population from the destructive effects of warfare 
through military means.1 Social institutions including but not 
limited to national governing institutions, inter-governmental 
institutions, and the military are all devices developed through 
human history to collectively address traditional security threats.  
Security is often considered to be an antithesis of the rule of 
law and civil liberty, justifying violation of rules and the restriction 
                                                 
1  Hans Kelsen, Collective Security under International Law (United States 
Government Printing Office, Washington DC, 1957) 1 (defining security as 
‘the protection of men against the use of force by other men’). 
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of freedom.2 However, the development of international law and 
the institutionalisation of international public authorities have 
contributed to the increased normalcy or containment of extra-legal 
response to security threats. For example, the Charter of the United 
Nations (UN Charter) provides institutionalised mechanisms as the 
means of regulating the behaviour of sovereign states and conflict 
among them.3 The nuclear non-proliferation regime establishes 
mechanisms for preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons 
and facilitating the development of peaceful nuclear energy 
technology by institutionalising the asymmetric obligations 
between designated nuclear-weapon states and other non-nuclear-
weapon states.4  
Yet, towards the end of the Cold War the concept of security 
began to expand, which subsequently led to the proliferation of 
contemporary security issues such as economic security, 
environmental security, energy and resource security, health 
security, and bio-security.5 The conception of security also took a 
dramatic turn following the 2001 terrorist attacks on New York and 
Washington, blurring the traditional boundaries between 
international security and national security threats.6 Those changes 
                                                 
2  For discussion, see especially, Jeremy Waldron, ‘Security and Liberty: The 
Image of Balance’ (2003) 11 Journal of Political Philosophy 191–210. See 
also concluding remarks by Thomas Pogge in this volume. 
3  Charter of the United Nations, opened for signature 26 June 1945, 1 UNTS 
XVI (entered into force 24 October 1945), Art. 24.  
4  Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, opened for signature 1 
July 1968, 729 UNTS 161 (entered into force 5 March 1970). See also, 
Chapter 9 by Kalman Robertson in this volume. 
5  See generally, Jessica Tuchman Mathews, ‘Redefining Security’ (1989) 
68(2) Foreign Affairs 162; Richard H. Ullman, ‘Redefining Security’ (1983) 
8 International Security 129. 
6  See, e.g., Miriam Gani and Penelope Matthew (eds.), Fresh Perspectives on 
the ‘War on Terror’ (ANU E-Press, Canberra, 2008); Dora Kostakopoulou, 
‘How to Do Things with Security Post 9/11’ (2008) 28 Oxford Journal of 
Legal Studies 317; Benjamin J. Goold and Liora Lazarus (eds.), Security and 
Human Rights (Hart Publishing, Oxford/Portland OR, 2007).  
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in the conception of security world-wide have tested the potential 
of existing institutions, such as the World Trade Organization 
(WTO), the World Health Organization (WHO), the International 
Maritime Organization (IMO), the Organization for Security and 
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the European Union (EU), and the 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), to assume a 
new role in the changing security paradigms both at international 
and domestic levels. 
The greater diversity in the range of security threats and 
actors in the modern globalised world challenges our traditional 
understanding of security institutions with the need for re-
evaluating the role, value, and limits of institutions in their 
relationship with security and the law. While institutions evolve by 
finding the need or an opportunity to adjust themselves to meet 
new challenges, that may well result in changing the intricate 
balance between security and the law that has been sustained within 
current legal frameworks. It is this tension, both in public and 
international law contexts, arising from the institutional 
development to address contemporary security threats and the 
existing legal frameworks delimiting the institutional response to 
security that forms the subject of this volume.  
This fifth volume in the series connecting public and 
international law, engages with this tension from legal perspectives 
linking international law and public law, forming the underlying 
theme throughout the series. Both international law and public law 
have been central not only to the normative foundation for the 
formation, development and exercise of public authority to address 
security threats by institutionalised mechanisms, but also to the 
regulation and restriction of the exercise of such public authority. It 
is these legal perspectives and issues that commonly characterise 
the chapters in this volume, providing a variety of theoretical 
inquiries and case studies critically examining sociological, 
psychological, political, and economic factors surrounding 
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institutional evolution in response to contemporary security 
challenges. It is the intention of this volume to unravel intricate 
issues at the intersection of the tripartite relationship between 
public law and international law, security and institutions in light of 
the expansion of contemporary security threats.   
2. Defining security institutions 
Institutions are not mere instruments of the creators, but are 
autonomous entities operating, to varying degrees, within an 
organisational structure and decision-making processes. Institutions 
seek to act in conformity with the norms that guide their operation, 
interpret and apply them, and often generate friction due to the 
inherent indeterminacy of norms. As Ian Johnstone observes, 
institutions engage, through operational activities, in legal 
argumentation with other stakeholders and contribute to cause 
indeterminate norms and soft law to ‘harden’ with shared 
understandings about what those norms truly mean in practice.7 
For the purpose of this book, security institutions are defined 
broadly, drawing on the definition of institutions proposed by 
Robert O Keohane, as ‘persistent and connected sets of rules, 
formal and informal, that prescribe behavioral roles, constrain 
activity, and shape expectations’,8 which by design or through 
                                                 
7  Ian Johnstone, ‘Law-Making through the Operational Activities of 
International Organizations’ (2008) 40 George Washington International 
Law Review 87, 122. 
8  Robert O. Keohane, International Institutions and State Power (Westview 
Press, Boulder, 1989) 3. Similarly, Robert Jervis, ‘Security Regime’ (1982) 
36 International Organization 357, 357. Compare this definition with the 
legal definition of international organisations adopted by the International 
Law Commission in Draft Articles on the Responsibility of International 
Organizations (2011) Yearbook of International Law Commission Vol. II, 
Part Two, Art. 2(a) (defining international organization as ‘an organization 
established by a treaty or other instrument governed by international law and 
possessing its own international legal personality’). 
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operational activities, deal with public security issues arising in the 
global or cross-border environment. This definition is broad and 
flexible enough to allow for the normative inquiries this volume is 
designed for, without necessarily restricting the scope of inquiry to 
the relationship between their constituent members within 
institutions.9 Although this broad definition may not be suited for 
empirical inquiry,10 it allows us to conceive of institutions in 
various forms as independent and autonomous entities capable of 
adaptation and evolution in response to the changing security 
paradigms as a framework of normative inquiry.  
Traditionally, the concept of security was narrowly confined 
in military terms with the primary focus on state protection from 
threats to national interests.11 Therefore, national military forces 
have long been the dominant focus of security institutions. In 
comparison, there are only a handful of security institutions at the 
international level originally designed to address traditional 
security concerns, including the UN Security Council and the 
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) regime. Celeste 
Wallander, Helga Haftendorn and Robert Keohane accordingly 
defined ‘security institutions’ rather narrowly, with a military-
oriented, state-centric view, as those ‘designed to protect the 
territorial integrity of states from the adverse use of military force; 
                                                 
9  Cf John J. Mearsheimer, ‘The False Promise of International Institutions’ 
(1994-1995) 19(3) International Security 5, 8 (defining institutions as ‘sets 
of rules that stipulate the ways in which states should cooperate and compete 
with each other’). 
10  See, Beth A. Simmons and Lisa L. Martin, ‘International Organizations and 
Institutions’ in Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse and Beth A. Simmons 
(eds.), Handbook of International Relations (SAGE Publications, London, 
2002) 194. 
11  See, e.g., Kelsen, above n. 1, 1; Hans Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: 
The Struggle for Power and Peace (Alfred A. Knopf, New York, 1950); 
Thomas Shelling, Arms and Influence (Yale University Press, New Haven, 
1966); Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Random House, 
New York, 1979). 
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to guard states’ autonomy against the political effects of the threat 
of such force; and to prevent the emergence of situations that could 
endanger states’ vital interests as they define them’.12 However, the 
expansion of the security concept particularly after the end of the 
Cold War and by a variety of institutions contributing to this 
expansion indicates a greater scope for considering a wider variety 
of institutions to be security institutions. 
Indeed the departure from the very narrow meaning and 
usage of security emerged even amidst the Cold War rivalry. For 
example, the nuclear arms race and in particular United States (US) 
President Reagan’s new nuclear deterrence policy led to the idea of 
common security in the 1980s to promote confidence between 
states and the cause of disarmament.13 The move towards an 
expanded notion of security has accelerated since the end of the 
Cold War, spawning a growth of security literature in the areas of 
economic security,14 environmental security,15 energy and resource 
security,16 food security,17 bio-security,18 and health security.19 The 
                                                 
12  Celeste A. Wallander, Helga Haftendorn, and Robert O. Keohane, 
‘Introduction’ in Helga Haftendorn, Robert O. Keohane, and Celeste A. 
Wallander (eds.), Imperfect Unions: Security Institutions over Time and 
Space (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1999) 1, 2. 
13  Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues, Common 
Security: A Blueprint for Survival (Simon and Schuster, New York, 1982); 
Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues, North-South: 
A Programme for Survival (Pan Books, London, 1980). See also, R. 
Väyryen, ‘Multilateral Security: Common, Cooperative or Collective?’ in 
M.G. Schechter (ed.), Future Multilateralism: The Political and Social 
Framework (United Nations University Press, Tokyo, 1999) 43, 55–57. 
14  See, e.g., V. Cable, ‘What Is International Economic Security?’ (1995) 71 
International Affairs 305. 
15  See, e.g., Simon Dalby, Security and Environmental Change (Polity Press, 
Cambridge, 2009) especially ch. 2; Simon Dalby, Environmental Security 
(University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 2002). 
16  See, e.g., Sam Raphael and Doug Stokes, ‘Energy Security’ in Alan Collins 
(ed.), Contemporary Security Studies (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2nd 
edn, 2010) 379. 
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UN Development Programme (UNDP) introduced the concept of 
human security into international policy discourse in its 1994 
Human Development Report,20 which has since been incorporated 
into key policy documents such as the 2000 UN Millennium 
Declaration.21 The UN Secretary-General’s High-Level Panel 
identified economic and social threats and transnational organised 
crime, as well as inter-state conflict, internal conflict, terrorism, 
and weapons of mass destruction as global security threats.22 The 
former UN Secretary-General’s 2005 Report, In Larger Freedom, 
adds to the list poverty, deadly infectious disease, and 
                                                                                                              
17  See, e.g., Wael Allam, ‘Food Supply Security, Sovereignty and International 
Peace and Security: Sovereignty As a Challenge to Food Supply Security’ in 
Ahmed Mahiou and Francis Snyder (eds.), Food Security and Food Safety 
(Martinus Nijhoff, Leiden, 2006) 325; Melaku Geboye Desta, ‘Food 
Security and International Trade Law: An Appraisal of the World Trade 
Organization Approach’ (2001) 35 Journal of World Trade 449.  
18  See, e.g., David P. Fidler and Lawrence O. Gostin, Biosecurity in the Global 
Age: Biological Weapons, Public Health, and the Rule of Law (Stanford 
University Press, Stanford, 2008); Mark Wheelis and Malcolm Dando, 
‘Neurobiology: A Case Study of the Imminent Militarization of Biology’ 
(2005) 87 International Review of the Red Cross 553; David L. Heymann, 
‘The Evolving Infectious Disease Threat: Implications for National and 
Global Security’ (2003) 4 Journal of Human Development 191. 
19  See, e.g., David P. Fidler, ‘From International Sanitary Conventions to 
Global Health Security: The New International Health Regulations’ (2005) 4 
Chinese Journal of International Law 325; Lincoln Chen and Vasant 
Narasimhan, ‘Human Security and Global Health’ (2003) 4 Journal of 
Human Development 181. 
20  United Nations Development Programme, Human Development Report 1994 
(United Nations, 1994) 22. 
21  GA Res 55/2 (8 September 2000). See also, Human Security: Report of the 
Secretary-General, UN Doc A/64/701 (8 March 2010). 
22  A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility – Report of the United 
Nations Secretary-General’s High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and 
Change, UN Doc A/59/565 (2 December 2004), 23. For discussion, see, G. 
Shafir, ‘Legal and Institutional Responses to Contemporary Global Threats: 
An Introduction to the U.N. Secretary-General’s High-Level Panel Report 
on Threats, Challenges and Change’ (2007) 38 California Western 
International Law Journal 1, 6–14. 
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environmental degradation on the grounds that these can have 
equally catastrophic consequences.23  
The expansion of the concept of security has been 
progressively, and yet often variably recognised as new security 
agendas by traditional security institutions such as the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).24 One most notable example 
is the debate on various human security agendas in the Security 
Council.25 It formally acknowledged an expanded notion of 
security when world leaders gathered in 1992, referring to a range 
of non-military sources of instability in the economic, social, 
humanitarian and ecological fields as threats to international peace 
and security.26 In 2000, the Security Council discussed the impact 
of HIV/AIDS on peace and security in Africa under the Council 
                                                 
23  Kofi A. Annan, In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security and 
Human Rights for All (United Nations, New York, 2005) [78]. 
24  For the transformation of NATO’s security agendas, see, e.g., Mats Berdal 
and David Ucko, ‘Whither NATO’ in Bruce D. Jones, Shepard Forman and 
Richard Gowan (eds.), Cooperating for Peace and Security: Evolving 
Institutions and Arrangements in a Context of Changing U.S. Security Policy 
(Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2010) 98; Frank Schimmelfennig, 
‘Transatlantic Relations, Multilateralism and the Transformation of NATO’ 
in Dimitris Bourantonis, Kostas Ifantis and Panayotis Tsakonas (eds.), 
Multilateralism and Security Institutions in an Era of Globalization 
(Routledge, Abingdon, 2008) 183; James Sperling, ‘Eurasian Security 
Governance: New Threats, Institutional Adaptations’ in James Sperling, 
Sean Kay and S. Victor Papacosma (eds.), Limiting Institutions? The 
Challenge of Eurasian Security Governance (Manchester University Press, 
Manchester, 2003) 3, 7–10. More generally, Emil J. Kirchner, ‘Regional and 
Global Security: Changing Threats and Institutional Responses’ in Emil J. 
Kirchner and James Sperling (eds.), Global Security Governance: 
Competing Perceptions of Security in the 21st Century (Routledge, London 
and New York, 2007) 3, 5–16. 
25  For a detailed analysis of different views expressed by states in the Security 
Council, see, Hitoshi Nasu, ‘The Place of Human Security in Collective 
Security’ (2013) 18 Journal of Conflict and Security Law 95. 
26  UN Doc S/PV.3046 (31 January 1992), especially the Presidential statement 
issued at the end of the proceedings at 143. 
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Presidency of US Vice-President Al-Gore,27 which set a precedent 
for Security Council debate on a broader security agenda.28 
Subsequently, the Security Council discussed the issue of Africa’s 
food security,29 largely in respect of its ‘incontrovertible link’ to 
peace and security,30 and the issue of climate change,31 which 
caused a stark division among states as to what can or should be 
appropriately considered as a security issue.32   
Other institutions have also been instrumental to this 
expansion of the concept of security. For example, the Conference 
on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE; later renamed as 
the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe: OSCE), 
a unique product of Cold War politics established by the 1975 
Helsinki Accords,33 provided for the first time a formal basis for 
the human rights agenda in the political discourse with the Soviet 
Union, which provided a foundation for its comprehensive security 
approach across politico-military, economic and ecological, and 
human dimensions.34 The IMO has addressed maritime security 
issues since 1985, following the Achille Lauro incident, against 
unlawful, deliberate acts of violence against ships and persons on 
                                                 
27  UN Doc S/PV.4087 (10 January 2000). 
28  Ibid. 2. 
29  UN Doc S/PV.4652 (3 December 2002); UN Doc S/PV.4736 (7 April 2003); 
UN Doc S/PV.5220 (30 June 2005). 
30  See especially, UN Doc S/PV.5220 (30 June 2005), 9 (Romania), 11 (the 
Philippines), 12 (Japan), 13 (China, Greece), 14 (Benin).   
31  UN S/PV.5663 and S/PV.5663 (Resumption 1) (17 April 2007); UN 
S/PV.6587 and S/PV.6587 (Resumption 1) (20 July 2011). 
32  For an analysis of the debate, see, Nasu, above n. 25, 118–120; Shirley V. 
Scott, ‘Securitising Climate Change: International Legal Implications and 
Obstacles’ (2008) 21 Cambridge Review of International Affairs 603. 
33  Final Act of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, 
adopted 1 August 1975, 14 ILM 1292. 
34  For details, see, e.g., Antonio Ortiz, ‘Neither Fox nor Hedgehog: NATO’s 
Comprehensive Approach and the OSCE’s Concept of Security’ (2008) 4 
Security and Human Rights 284.  
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board ships.35 More recently, the WHO has embraced the idea of 
global public health security by expanding the scope of its activities 
to encompass ‘illness or medical condition, irrespective of origin or 
source, that presents or could present significant harm to humans’ 
in the 2005 International Health Regulation.36  
The form of institutions has also diversified, ranging from 
formal international organisations established by treaties to expert 
bodies usually for supervising and monitoring compliance with 
treaty obligations such as the International Atomic Energy Agency 
(IAEA), and even to non-treaty based institutions such as OSCE.37 
Domestic government institutions have been building trans-
governmental networks to coordinate policy implementation and 
respond effectively to challenges posed by transnational security 
issues such as terrorism, illicit trafficking of weapons of mass 
destruction-related materials, human trafficking and piracy.38 In 
addition, international non-governmental organisations and private 
entities have also become increasingly drawn into security policy-
making and implementation, as can be found in the counter-piracy 
and cyber security initiatives.39   
                                                 
35  See generally, e.g., Martmut Hesse and Nicolaos L. Charalambous, ‘New 
Security Measures for the International Shipping Community’ (2004) 3(2) 
World Maritime University Journal of Maritime Affairs 123, 124. For further 
analysis, see, Chapter 4 by Chie Kojima in this volume. 
36  Revision of the International Health Regulations, WHA Res 58.3 (23 May 
2005) (hereinafter 2005 IHR), opened for signature 23 May 2005, 2509 
UNTS 79 (entered into force 15 June 2007) (hereinafter 2005 IHR), Art. 1. 
For further analysis, see, Chapter 10 by Adam Kamradt-Scott in this volume.  
37  Geir Ulfstein, ‘Institutions and Competences’ in Jan Klabbers, Anne Peters, 
and Geir Ulfstein (eds.), The Constitutionalization of International Law 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009) 45, 46–55. 
38  See, Anne-Marie Slaughter, A New World Order (Princeton University 
Press, Princeton, 2004) 36–64.   
39  See, Chapter 4 by Chie Kojima and Chapter 14 by Ottavio Quirico in this 
volume. 
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There are also institutions not originally designed to address 
security issues, adapting to incorporate them through operational 
activities. For example, the EU has developed civil and military 
crisis management operations through institutional evolution of its 
Common Foreign and Security Policy.40 The Economic 
Community of Western African States (ECOWAS), established to 
facilitate economic development of its member states, has engaged 
in peacekeeping operations, notably in Liberia in the 1990s.41 
ASEAN was established as the political platform with dual 
functions to maintain the regional stability and to ensure the 
internal stability and security of the government in each member 
state,42 but has also been playing a greater role to address ‘non-
traditional security issues’, whilst being guided by the norm of 
comprehensive security.43  
The expansion of the concept of security together with 
institutional evolution in a variety of forms, has arguably led to the 
expanded role for inter-governmental institutions, international 
expert bodies, domestic government institutions and even private 
institutions to address a wide range of contemporary security issues 
that states are facing. The greater role of security institutions 
through their institutional development may well be considered to 
                                                 
40  See, Chapter 3 by Anne McNaughton in this volume. 
41  See, Chapter 7 by Hitoshi Nasu in this volume. 
42  Amitav Acharya, Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia: 
ASEAN and the Problem of Regional Order (Routledge, London, 2001) 57; 
P. Saipiroon, ASEAN Governments’ Attitudes Towards Regional Security 
1975–1979 (Bangkok: Institute of Asian Studies, 1982) 5–7. 
43  ASEAN Political-Security Community Blueprint, Section B, at 
http://www.asean.org/archive/5187-18.pdf. See generally, M. Caballero-
Anthony, ‘Challenging Change: Nontraditional Security, Democracy and 
Regionalism’ in Donald K. Emmerson (ed.), Hard Choices: Security, 
Democracy, and Regionalism in Southeast Asia (Walter H Shorenstein Asia-
Pacific Research Center, Stanford, 2008) 191; Mely Caballero-Anthony, 
‘Revisioning Human Security in Southeast Asia’ (2004) 28(3) Asian 
Perspective 155. 
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be the result of a natural progression of institutional activities in 
response to changing security paradigms. However, institutional 
evolution does not take place in a political, legal and historical 
vacuum, but is an inevitable process of adaptation for survival 
according to the changes in the surrounding security 
environment.44 That process may well involve normative 
influences, challenging the existing institutional rules, raising 
issues of legitimacy and accountability, and causing collision with 
other institutions. Thus, institutional evolution, when it is promoted 
by the security imperative, requires legal inquiries into its effects 
within the existing legal frameworks, which is facilitated by 
drawing from the connections between public and international 
law.  
3. Themes and structure of the volume 
These institutional developments in response to the changing 
security environment and the emergence of non-traditional security 
challenges raise a number of normative and legal questions at the 
intersection of public and international law, security and 
institutions. Consequently, this volume is divided into four parts, 
each examining different aspects of the tension between 
institutional development and the legal frameworks dealing with 
contemporary security threats. 
3.1 Security and institutional evolution 
The first theme concerns the theoretical underpinning of 
institutional evolution in the context of changing security 
paradigms. Different theories have developed different types of 
                                                 
44  See, Cheryl Shanks, Harold K. Jacobson, and Jeffrey H. Kaplan, ‘Inertia and 
Change in the Constellation of International Governmental Organizations, 
1981–1992’ (1995) 50 International Organization 593. 
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institutional analysis in social sciences.45 The rational choice 
theory may explain institutional evolution as a result of states 
attempting to further their own national interests.46 Accordingly to 
neoliberal institutionalism, institutionalisation is subject to the 
degree of shared expectations of participatory behaviour, 
specificity of codified institutional rules, and differentiated 
functions and responsibilities among its participants.47 Historical 
institutionalism, on the other hand, conceives institutional 
evolution as being affected by various factors including personal 
preferences and rules, which can only be explained in a historical 
and comparative context.48 The revolutionary theory, which has 
more recently emerged in literature, attempts to understand 
institutional evolution as a more dynamic process due to the 
interdependence and complex interaction of endogenous and 
                                                 
45  Peter Hall and Rosemary Taylor, ‘Political Science and the Three New 
Institutionalism’ (1996) 44 Political Studies 936. 
46  See, e.g., Barbara Koremenos, Charles Lipson and Duncan Snidal, ‘The 
Rational Design of International Institutions’ (2005) 55 International 
Organization 761; David A. Lake, ‘Beyond Anarchy: The Importance of 
Security Institutions’ (2001) 26 International Security 129, 157. Cf Richard 
Gowan and Bruce D. Jones, ‘Conclusion: International Institutions and the 
Problems of Adaptation’ in Jones, Forman and Gowan (eds.), above n. 24, 
311, 314 and 319 (observing that ‘there is no necessary correlation between 
balance of power in international politics and the structure, or even the 
behavior, of international institutions’ and that ‘real shifts in the balance of 
power do not necessarily create institutional adaptation’).   
47  Celeste A. Wallander and Robert O. Keohane, ‘Risk, Threat, and Security 
Institutions’ in Helga Haftendorn, Robert O. Keohane, and Celeste A. 
Wallender (eds.), Imperfect Unions: Security Institutions over Time and 
Space (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1999) 21, 24.  
48  See, e.g., Orfeo Fioretos, ‘Historical Institutionalism in International 
Relations’ (2011) 65 International Organization 367–399; Sven Steinmo, 
Kathleen A. Thelen, and Frank Longstreth, Structuring Politics: Historical 
Institutionalism in Comparative Analysis (Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 1992). 
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exogenous variables.49 The relevant inquiry for the purpose of this 
volume is how the concept of security influences institutional 
evolution in general or in a specific context.   
According to the ‘securitisation’ theory developed by the 
Copenhagen School, the discourse of security can be understood as 
a speech-act in the processes of constructing a shared 
understanding of what is considered a threat.50 During these 
processes of securitisation, institutional evolution may well provide 
a means to regularise the response to a newly identified security 
threat, as seen in the development of UN collective security 
institutions such as the gradual expansion of peacekeeping 
operations and, more recently, ‘quasi-legislative’ resolutions 
adopted by the Security Council.51 However, the security 
imperative is not the only factor influencing the direction of 
institutional evolution, but rather interacts with other factors, some 
of which may be desirable or undesirable from a normative 
perspective. What factors will or should interact with the security 
imperative in facilitating, or hindering, institutional evolution in 
response to contemporary security issues? Are there particular 
factors that should assist regularising collective responses to a 
security threat in institutional settings, rather than undermining or 
overriding existing institutional processes? Are there any normative 
considerations that should guide or restrain existing institutional 
processes,52 through which the institutional competence can be 
expanded to respond to contemporary security issues?    
                                                 
49  See, Mark Blyth, Geoffrey M. Hodgson, Orion Lewis, and Sven Steinmo, 
‘Introduction to the Special Issue on the Evolution of Institutions’ (2011) 7 
Journal of Institutional Economics 299, 305–309. 
50  Barry Buzan, O. Wæver and J. de Wilde, Security: A New Framework for 
Analysis (Lynne Rienner, Boulder, 1998) 23–26. 
51  SC Res 1373 (28 September 2001); SC Res 1540 (28 April 2004). For 
further analysis, see, Chapter 6 by Anna Hood in this volume. 
52  Cf Ian Johnstone, ‘Normative Evaluation at the UN: Impact on Operational 
Activities’ in Jones, Forman and Gowan (eds.), above n. 24, 187. 
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In Chapter 1, Alexandra Walker considers the role of 
‘conscious’ and ‘unconscious’ security in security institution 
building, drawing on psychological and sociological studies of 
‘collective self’. From a sociological perspective, the ‘collective 
consciousness’ involves a collective narrative identity, which 
affects how collectives frame their security relationships, and 
allows the collective self to reflect on its values and goals and 
possibly to adapt or transform itself in response to the changing 
security environment. The ‘collective unconsciousness’, on the 
other hand, refers to the distorted sense of vulnerability that 
consists of all the psychic contents that individuals and collectives 
deem to be worthless which, when repressed, prompt the collective 
self to overcompensate the vulnerability by controlling all others 
and the security environment. Having identified that collective 
selves exist in a state of constant tension between their 
consciousness and unconscious security, Walker argues that it is 
optimal for the pursuit of security to be based upon conscious, 
rather than unconscious security. It is her finding that 
institutionalised self-reflective decision-making processes can 
facilitate a collective self to habitually process its unconscious 
material and thus help realising conscious security. 
Bina D’Costa turns the focus to gender justice in Chapter 2, 
which often becomes a politicised issue concerning the roles and 
rights of women in counterproductive ways in post-conflict security 
institution building. Drawing on experiences of peacebuilding 
efforts in Pakistan and Afghanistan, D’Costa considers whether 
normative considerations such as gender justice ought to steer or 
contain existing institutional processes, through which institutional 
capability is strengthened to address contemporary security issues.  
In particular, this chapter examines the evolution of ‘anti-state local 
security institutions’, which are often labelled as ‘terrorist 
organisations’ or ‘militant groups’ in mainstream political 
discourse, and the role these institutions play in sustaining and 
reinforcing gender bias. Thus, D’Costa argues, notwithstanding the 
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gender mainstreaming rhetoric and gender justice norm accepted 
internationally, women’s vulnerability and insecurity increases in 
times of conflicts not only from the actions of the religious forces 
but also from ‘progressive’, ‘secular’ and ‘humanitarian’ 
interventions. 
In Chapter 3, Anne McNaughton focuses on the EU as a ‘sui 
generis legal system’ and its evolution under the Common Foreign 
and Security Policy. Because of the way in which the competences 
of the EU and its member states are carefully articulated and 
delineated, any institutional evolution challenges the demarcation 
of competences in light of the jurisprudence underpinning that 
process. While this is difficult to conceive from the more 
traditional public and international law perspectives, McNaughton 
suggests that the concept of ‘de-centred regulation’ from the 
regulation literature can better explain how the rule of law in 
Europe has transcended the state and ‘de-centred’ security 
regulation through institutional evolution. Viewed from this 
perspective, it becomes clear that the EU’s institutional evolution in 
respect of its Common Foreign and Security Policy has not been 
guided by any centralised security response by the EU institutions, 
but has rather been a carefully negotiated response to concerns 
about centralisation of powers to the EU institutions. As 
McNaughton observes, the de-centralised security regulation in 
Europe is a critical factor that has allowed the EU to respond 
flexibly to new security threats in ways that do not undermine the 
carefully delineated and articulated institutional relationship 
between the EU and its member states.      
Chapter 4 by Chie Kojima broadens the scope of inquiry into 
the maritime domain, with the focus on the evolving role of the 
IMO in building international maritime security institutions. The 
IMO has contributed to the building of maritime security 
institutions not only by assisting its member states to establish 
cooperative frameworks, but also by providing forums in which 
public and private actors can form their shared policies. Kojima 
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demonstrates the institutionalising role of the IMO with many 
examples of public and private initiatives taken against piracy and 
armed robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of 
Aden. In her view, this presents a unique case where the security 
notion is linked to private interests, which has necessitated the IMO 
playing a central role in facilitating multiple processes in which all 
the interested actors – both public and private – participate in order 
to achieve the common goal of protecting maritime security. 
3.2 Security institutions and the rule of law 
The second theme looks at the relationship between security and 
the rule of law in international and domestic institutional settings. It 
is an established principle of international institutional law that the 
competence of international institutions is not unlimited but is 
restricted by the provisions of the constitutive instrument, in terms 
both of form and substance.53 On the other hand, international 
institutions’ constitutive instruments are often considered as their 
constitutional documents requiring a teleological approach to 
interpretation through subsequent practice of the institutions 
themselves.54 Domestic security institutions, which are often 
governed and directed by the executive arm of the government, 
may have more liberty in institutional development, but the growth 
                                                 
53  See generally, C. F. Amerasinghe, Principles of the Institutional Law of 
International Organizations (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2nd 
edn, 2005) 194–196; Philippe Sands and Pierre Klein, Bowett’s Law of 
International Institutions (Sweet and Maxwell, London, 5th edn, 2001) 292–
293.  
54  See, e.g., Bardo Fassbender, The United Nations Charter as the Constitution 
of the International Community (Martinus Nijhoff, Leiden, 2009) 129–136; 
Catherine Brölmann, The Institutional Veil in Public International Law: 
International Organisations and the Law of Treaties (Hart Publishing, 
Oxford/Portland, OR, 2007) 113–123. 
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of public law in the latter half of the twentieth century has led to 
greater legal restrictions and judicial oversight of their activities.55  
In the case of security institutions, however, the security 
imperative appears to have prompted some commentators to 
observe that institutions may derogate from certain norms or stretch 
the interpretation of indeterminate norms through operational 
activities. Such derogation or expansive interpretation raises 
questions concerning the legal limits of their activities.56 For 
example, the strong assertion of national security, especially after 
the 9/11 terrorist attacks in New York, led to a larger space devoid 
of the rule of law control over counter-terrorism and counter-
insurgency operations, giving rise to a debate over the role and 
limits of legal institutions in dealing with security issues.57 In a 
similar vein, the Security Council has started exercising 
‘legislative’ or ‘judicial’ powers under Articles 25 and 103 of the 
UN Charter in dealing with global terrorism threats even at the 
expense of human rights protection.58 It is debatable whether this 
development is to be seen favourably or as the emergence of 
hegemonic international law that needs to be constrained.59 In any 
event, there is a perceived danger that ‘many repressive states 
                                                 
55  See generally, Mark Aronson, Bruce D. Dyer, and Matthew Groves, Judicial 
Review of Administrative Action (Thomson, Sydney, 4th edn, 2008); P. 
Craig, Administrative Law (Sweet and Maxwell, London, 4th edn, 1999); S. 
A. de Smith, H. Woolf and J. Jowell, Judicial Review of Administrative 
Action (Sweet and Maxwell, London, 5th edn, 1995); H. W. R. Wade and C. 
Forsyth, Administrative Law (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 8th edn, 
2000).   
56  See generally, Goold and Lazarus (eds.), above n 6.  
57  For discussion, see, e.g., David Dyzenhaus, The Constitution of Law: 
Legality in a Time of Emergency (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 
2006) 42–53. 
58  See, e.g., SC Res 1373 (28 September 2001); SC Res 1333 (19 December 
2000); SC Res 1267 (15 October 1999).  
59  For discussion, see, e.g., José E Alvarez, International Organizations as 
Law-Makers (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2005) 199–217. 
Introduction 19 
 
might see a Security Council resolution as an excuse to clamp 
down on dissidents under the guide that they are terrorists’.60  
While each institution has its own legal framework within 
which its authority and institutional competence is defined, there 
are underlying questions common to security institutions. To what 
extent and in what way should the law respond to the security 
imperative facilitating institutional evolution? Should there be an 
international rule of law restraining institutional responses to 
contemporary security issues? Could domestic public law 
jurisprudence assist in developing such an international rule of law 
governing institutions? Conversely, how does the security 
imperative influence security institutions in shaping their legal 
response or in revisiting their institutional powers and competence?   
The starting point in exploring these questions must be 
located in the traditional sources of international law, as Imogen 
Saunders attempts to do in Chapter 5 with the focus on the general 
principles of law provided in Article 38(1)(c) of the Statute of the 
International Court of Justice.61 The application of the general 
principles of law has the potential to extend the idea of the rule of 
law to the conduct of international security institutions, by virtue of 
its ability to derive binding norms of international law through 
analogy from domestic legal principles of a horizontal generality 
across different legal systems, including public law principles. On 
that basis, Saunders considers three aspects of public law principles 
– the principle of formal legality, constitutional interpretive 
principles, and certain administrative principles such as due 
process, access to remedies, accountability, transparency and 
judicial review – as potential candidates of the general principles of 
                                                 
60  Nigel D. White, ‘The Security Council, the Security Imperative and 
International Law’ in Matthew Happold (ed.), International Law in a 
Multipolar World (Routledge, London and New York, 2012) 4, 15. 
61  Opened for signature 26 June 1945, 1 UNTS 993 (entered into force 24 
October 1945). 
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law in order to examine their applicability to international security 
institutions. Saunders concludes by arguing that the use of these 
public law principles can and will confer legitimacy on the conduct 
of international security institutions that conform to those 
requirements – a question which is further elaborated upon in the 
next part of this volume.  
The fact that security institutions such as the UN Security 
Council essentially deals with security threats may mean that their 
‘legislative’ activity is a form of emergency law-making that is 
analogous to the law that is produced by domestic executives in 
times of crisis. This is the proposition that Anna Hood explores in 
Chapter 6, with the focus on the Security Council’s ‘legislative’ 
activity. In many respects, the Security Council’s ‘legislative’ 
resolutions share the same characteristics as domestic emergency 
legislation,62 and this provides the basis for the application of Carl 
Schmitt’s theory on the state of exception to explain the nature of 
the Security Council’s ‘legislative’ activities. However, there are 
several normative considerations in emergency law theories which, 
as Hood examines, could find useful application to enhance the 
Security Council’s compliance with the rule of law. Hood reaches 
the conclusion that while none of these normative considerations is 
actionable with respect to the Security Council’s legislative 
practice, the emergency law perspective still provides a useful way 
of re-examining the underlying assumptions of emergency law-
making in different institutional settings. 
Security imperatives may prompt other types of institutions 
to evolve and push their boundaries, posing challenges to existing 
legal arrangements. Chapter 7 by Hitoshi Nasu examines the 
evolution of African institutions in the 1990s to the early 2000s as 
case studies, in which irregularities in the decision-making for 
deployment of peacekeeping forces arguably meant that the 
                                                 
62  The ‘legislation’ for the purpose of Chapter 6 is widely defined to include 
those that create or modify international legal obligations.  
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institutions acted ultra vires. The fact that the African institutions 
applied the doctrinal framework of traditional peacekeeping was 
significant and instrumental to compensatory institutional 
evolution, which according to Nasu, has contributed to facilitating 
general support of their member states for the out-of-competence 
regional actions. Nasu concludes that even though institutional 
evolutions, triggered by security imperatives, often pose challenges 
to the basic principles of international institutional law, the rhetoric 
and formula of peacekeeping as an ‘institution’ has assisted in 
producing a general agreement within a regional organisation in the 
form of an ‘emergency amendment’ to its constitutive instrument, 
muting the issue of validity. One of the potential ramifications of 
this finding is that the traditional peacekeeping ‘institution’ can 
play a valuable role when an international or regional institution 
which is not originally mandated to deal with peace and security 
issues, finds the need to expand its institutional competence in 
dealing with pressing security threats.    
In Chapter 8, Solon Solomon brings this issue of institutional 
evolution to Israel’s border security which involves both public 
(domestic) and international institutions. Solomon examines how 
public and international institutions have approached Israel’s 
national border security in respect of its border with Egypt, the 
1967 armistice lines in the West Bank, and the Gaza boundary after 
the Israeli disengagement from Gaza Strip in 2005. Through his 
thorough analysis, it becomes clear that institutional settings, 
decision-making procedures and political conditions surrounding 
each institution influence the way in which the relationship 
between security and the law is viewed within the parameters of 
international law. This leads to his finding that the relationship 
between security and law is not pre-determined, and that a security 
imperative is not a monolithic concern shared by different 
institutions in the same way. This inevitably creates tension as to 
what extent security concerns should be taken into account in the 
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application of the law and under what circumstances security 
concerns can override the pre-existing legal arrangements.          
3.3 Security institutions and legitimacy 
The third theme examines the impact of securitisation on the 
legitimacy and accountability of institutions. Institutions cannot 
function without the exercise of their power conferred by the 
legitimate source of authority – be they a democratically elected 
government or with state consent. When institutions evolve through 
their operational activities, however, their exercise of power is 
inevitably one step away from the source of legitimacy. Thus, the 
delegation of powers to international institutions has often been 
suspected to undermine the separation of powers within states,63 to 
the extent that institutional decisions by-pass domestic procedures 
(often involving democratic processes) for legitimising the 
delegation of powers,64 which has raised an issue of institutional 
legitimacy. This issue of institutional legitimacy is not unique to 
international institutions, but has also been studied elsewhere in the 
domestic context, particularly in relation to the accountability of 
regulatory agencies as the fourth branch of government.65  
Legitimacy is a highly contested concept and is variously 
understood in different contexts of international law. Anthony 
D’Amato describes it simply as a space between international law 
and international politics by illuminating the existence of such a 
space in the de facto recognition of a government and the process 
                                                 
63  Dan Sarooshi, International Organizations and Their Exercise of Sovereign 
Powers (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2005) 15. 
64  Neils Blokker, ‘Beyond “Dili”: On the Powers and Practice of International 
Organizations’ in Gerard Kreijen et al (eds.), State, Sovereignty, and 
International Governance (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2002) 299, 
307–308. 
65  See, Martin Shapiro, Who Guards the Guardians?: Judicial Control of 
Administration (University of Georgia Press, Athens, 1988).  
Introduction 23 
 
of forming customary international law.66 Similarly, in the context 
of military action, legitimacy is used for different purposes. The 
2004 High-Level Panel Report, A More Secure World, developed 
guidelines for enhancing the legitimacy of the Security Council’s 
lawful military enforcement action under the UN Charter.67 A 
contrasting, more controversial use of legitimacy was made during 
NATO’s intervention in Kosovo by the supporters, acknowledging 
that the action was unlawful without Security Council authorisation 
and yet arguing that it was still legitimate.68 In the seminal work on 
legitimacy in international law, Thomas Franck defines it as a 
‘property of a rule or rule-making institution which itself exerts a 
pull toward compliance on those addressed normatively because 
those addressed believe that [it] operates in accordance with 
generally accepted principles of right process’.69  
However, when the concept is used in institutional settings, it 
addresses the normative force (or a ‘pull’) of institutional activity, 
which often relates to the notion of accountability. Ian Hurd, for 
example, understands institutional legitimacy as a subjective 
quality and relational concept, defined by an actor’s normative 
belief or perception that a rule of law ought to be obeyed.70 
                                                 
66  Anthony D’Amato, ‘On the Legitimacy of International Institutions’ in 
Rüdiger Wolfrum and Volker Röben (eds.), Legitimacy in International Law 
(Springer, Heidelberg, 2008) 83, 83–86. 
67  A More Secure World, above n. 22, 66–67. 
68  See, e.g., Anthea Roberts, ‘Legality vs Legitimacy: Can Uses of Force be 
Illegal But Justified?’ in Philip Alston and Euan MacDonald (eds.), Human 
Rights, Intervention, and the Use of Force (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 
2008) 179. 
69  Thomas M. Franck, The Power of Legitimacy among Nations (Oxford 
University Press, Oxford, 1990) 24. 
70  Ian Hurd, After Anarchy: Legitimacy and Power in the United Nations 
Security Council (Princeton University Press, Princeton, 2007) 7. It is close 
to a sociological understanding of organisational legitimacy. See, Mark C. 
Suchman, ‘Managing Legitimacy: Strategic and Institutional Approaches’ 
(1995) 20 Academy of Management Review 571. 
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Similarly, Allen Buchanan and Robert Keohane define it by 
reference to certain ‘epistemic virtues’ that facilitate the ongoing 
critical revision of the institutional goals, through interaction with 
the agents and organisations outside the institution.71    
General discussion about global administrative law and 
public law perspectives towards the exercise of public authority by 
international institutions often involves recommendations for 
greater public participation in institutional decision-making, strict 
procedural requirements, substantive judicial review, and a 
combination thereof, as a way of enhancing institutional 
legitimacy.72 The question relevant to the context of security 
institutions is, however: to what extent those ideas may or may not 
help security institutions in enhancing the legitimacy of their 
institutional evolution through operational activities? Does the 
security imperative prevailing over many aspects of current 
international and transnational relations require or allow existing 
international institutions to take their own path, even though it is 
not explicitly provided for in the constitutive instrument that 
governs their activities, to facilitate flexible and prompt response? 
Is there any role that international law can play in enhancing or 
undermining institutional legitimacy in the process of institutional 
evolution in response to the emergence of contemporary security 
issues?  
Chapter 9 by Kalman Robertson examines the thesis that 
challenges to the legitimacy of the International Atomic Energy 
Agency (IAEA) have been maintained through the development of 
its legal authority to administer comprehensive safeguards 
                                                 
71  Allen Buchanan and Robert O. Keohane, ‘The Legitimacy of Global 
Governance Institutions’ (2006) 20 Ethics & International Affairs 405, 406.  
72  See generally, Armin von Bogdandy et al (eds.), The Exercise of Public 
Authority by International Institutions: Advancing International Institutional 
Law (Springer, Heidelberg, 2010); Benedict Kingsbury, Nico Krisch, and 
Richard B. Stewart, ‘The Emergence of Global Administrative Law’ (2005) 
68 Law and Contemporary Problems 15. 
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agreements under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty at least as 
far as non-nuclear-weapon states are concerned. Challenges have 
been posed due to the increased tensions between military and 
peaceful uses of nuclear technologies as these are relied upon to 
address increasingly serious energy security concerns around the 
world, following a series of findings of non-compliance in the last 
twenty years. Through detailed analysis of the IAEA’s institutional 
evolution, particularly in comparison with other monitoring 
institutions, Robertson finds that its normative foundation lies with 
the epistemic virtues exhibited through generating reliable 
information on state behaviour, operating transparently, and 
providing information for on-going deliberation, rather than greater 
public participation in or substantive judicial review of its 
activities.      
As is the case with the evolution of the IAEA, international 
law has also been instrumental to the evolution of the WHO as a 
global public health security institution, as Adam Kamradt-Scott 
discusses in Chapter 10. In recent years, two international 
agreements have been adopted with a view to expanding the 
WHO’s legal authority to strengthen global response capacity in 
combating infectious disease outbreaks and other adverse health 
events: the 2005 International Health Regulations (IHR 2005);73 
and the 2011 Pandemic Influenza Preparedness Framework 
(PIPF).74 The 2005 IHR has altered the nature of the regulations 
from one of reactive border controls to proactive risk management 
and disease containment. The 2011 PIPF has served to re-shape an 
established WHO technical cooperation network into a new public-
private partnership. By exploring this institutional evolution of the 
WHO through the securitisation of public health issues, Kamradt-
Scott identifies the central role that international law has played in 
                                                 
73  2005 IHR, above n. 36. 
74  Pandemic Influenza Preparedness: Sharing of Influenza Viruses and Access 
to Vaccines and Other Benefits, WHA Res 64.5 (24 May 2011). 
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enhancing its institutional legitimacy, however, at the same time 
warns that global health security is likely to remain elusive and 
may result in undermining its institutional legitimacy unless states 
take necessary action to cooperate with the WHO. 
A contrasting observation is made by See Seng Tan in 
Chapter 11, in which Tan examines Southeast Asia’s embryonic 
efforts to settle disputes with an institutional approach. The 
adoption of the ASEAN Charter in 2007, and the recourse to legal 
means for dispute settlement by several Southeast Asian states, can 
be seen as a slow but gradual shift towards a greater acceptance of 
institutionalised means of dispute settlement in the region. Tan 
reviews actual state practice in trade and territorial disputes and 
demonstrates the persistent ambivalence in Southeast Asian states’ 
attitudes towards an institutionalised approach to dispute 
settlement. This is, Tan argues, due to the consideration shared by 
ASEAN states that keeping ASEAN as a consensus-based 
organisation is as significant as keeping an instrumental and 
strategic choice for individual member states. Indeed, Tan finds 
paradoxical institutionalising the ‘ASEAN Way’ in the ASEAN 
Charter as it has the potential to undermine the legitimacy of 
ASEAN by depriving it of the benefits of flexible consensus it once 
enjoyed.    
3.4 Security institutions and regime collision 
The fourth theme focuses on the impact of securitisation by 
institutions on their interaction or collision with external factors 
such as competing institutions and legal frameworks. Institutional 
evolution necessarily takes place within meta-institutional 
frameworks in which other institutions and interests are influenced 
by the changes that one institution makes to its own activities. In 
international law, such interactions and collisions have been 
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studied as an issue of regime conflict.75 The UN International Law 
Commission’s work on fragmentation of international law goes 
some way to address this issue by identifying technical legal 
methodologies that resolve a conflict of laws.76 However, these 
legal methodologies may not be capable of addressing the 
underlying tension between different normative foundations as well 
as legal structures, when these interactions and collisions arise from 
institutional evolution in response to contemporary security 
challenges.  
As Andreas Fischer-Lescano and Gunther Teubner argue, 
international legal norm collisions ‘educ[e] from the underlying 
conflicts between the “policies” pursued by different international 
organisations and regulatory regimes’.77 These interactions and 
collisions can also be explained in terms of the specific purposes 
and the institutional design features that underpin each regime, 
whether they are embedded in the constitutive instrument or are 
loosely shared by the major decision-makers as can be seen in the 
investment treaty arbitration regime.78 As a result, institutions, 
international and domestic alike, are increasingly facing the 
challenge that they have to internalise conflicting norms, 
                                                 
75  See especially, Dirk Pulkowski, The Law and Politics of International 
Regime Conflict (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2014); Margaret A. 
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Fragmentation (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2012); Tomer 
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obligations and interests, and account for their implementation to 
other relevant institutions.79 How and to what extent can existing 
legal obligations prevent security institutions from effectively 
respond to contemporary security issues? Is it possible through the 
process of institutional evolution to accommodate competing 
norms or interests in creating an effective regime to address a 
particular security issue? 
These questions are examined in Chapters 12 and 13 with the 
focus on two different types of food security problems – long-term, 
chronic food security issues by Dilan Thampapillai, and short-term, 
acute food security issues by Michael Ewing-Chow, Melanie 
Vilarasau Slade and Liu Gehuan. Thampapillai identifies the causes 
of chronic food insecurity as a form of market failure facilitated by 
the rules of international intellectual property law, as primarily 
embodied in the Agreement on the Trade Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS).80  While acknowledging that 
food insecurity is not a problem solely created by the post-TRIPS 
legal environment, Thampapillai argues that the legal rules on 
intellectual property play a significant role in supporting and 
encouraging those market forces that adversely impact upon the 
access, availability and affordability of food, and in causing 
significant disruptions to the traditional farming practices of 
farmers in the Global South. International responses, orchestrated 
by the Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO), to the food 
security problem in the context of agriculture, comprising the 
movement towards farmer’s rights and the right to food, have 
offered some useful solutions to the crisis. After examining the 
legal frameworks relevant to food security, Thampapillai provides 
three critiques of FAO’s response to the problem of food security 
                                                 
79  Hilary Charlesworth and Christine Chinkin, ‘Regulatory Frameworks in 
International Law’ in Christine Parker et al (eds.), Regulating Law (Oxford 
University Press, Oxford, 2004) 246, 247. 
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with the finding that the regime conflict deprives FAO of a useful 
role in norm creation, effective administration of food security, and 
reconciliation of ‘norm collision’ to overcome a property-type 
policy response.    
Chapter 13 by Ewing-Chow, Slade and Gehuan considers 
short-term, acute food security crises in the context of Asia, with 
the focus on the ASEAN Plus Three Emergency Rice Reserve 
(APTERR) and its relationship with international trade law. 
APTERR is an institutional response to an acute food security crisis 
in 2008, which has created a mechanism whereby its member states 
maintain a rice reserve which can be released in times of 
emergency for the benefit of the populations of regional states. 
When this short-term food security institution emerged, as Ewing-
Chow, Slade and Gehuan examines, several legal issues were 
identified in relation to international trade law rules particularly in 
terms of the restriction on the origin of the rice and the way in 
which the rice was to be released and distributed. In the end, 
international trade law rules assisted in shaping APTERR rather 
than causing a collision and, in the authors’ view, even facilitated 
the institution building to achieve a certain level of detail to avoid a 
potential collision, which is beneficial in ensuring an effective 
implementation of the regime.     
The final chapter by Ottavio Quirico deals with cyber 
security institutions with a specific focus on the role of private 
cyber security providers, and their interactions with the 
international and domestic rules governing the use of force. Cyber 
security is at the nascent stage of development and its institution 
building is primarily led by private cyber security providers. 
However, unlike state authorities, those private actors do not 
possess legal authority to use armed force beyond the scope of self-
defence, for the purpose of law enforcement or military operations. 
This legal restriction existing under the relevant rules of 
international and domestic law poses challenges to the operation of 
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private cyber security institutions, depending on how the notion of 
‘use of force’ or ‘lethal force’ is interpreted when cyber methods 
are used. Quirico argues that the existing rules of international and 
domestic law applies to cyber security operations, which prohibits 
private actors from engaging in cyber security counter-measures 
beyond the scope of self-defence or, in the situation of an armed 
conflict, will make them lawful targets as civilians directly 
participating in hostilities. In his view, these legal consequences 
might prevent private cyber security institutions from effectively 
responding to cyber security threats. 
4. Conclusion 
This volume’s four parts, in examining different aspects of the 
tensions between institutional development and the public and 
international law frameworks dealing with contemporary security 
threats, provide new and important ways of thinking about these 
pressing issues. Until this series of books developed, international 
and public law issues had mainly overlapped in discussions on how 
international law is implemented domestically.81 The scholarship 
emerging in the area of global administrative law has also been 
developing principles relevant to both public and international 
law,82 yet these publications contained only a subset of the 
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concepts underpinning this book. By concentrating on legal 
perspectives on security institutions, this volume has added to this 
series contributions by broadening our understanding of how public 
and international law intersects in harnessing, regulating, 
legitimising and shaping institutional responses to contemporary 
security threats as the notion of security expands.  
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